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Introduction 
In this paper I examine William Ockham's theory of judgment - in 
particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects.1 
'Judgment' (Latin iudicio) is the expression Ockham and other medieval 
thinkers use to refer to a certain subset of what philosophers nowadays 
call 'propositional attitudes.' Judgments include all and only those men- 
tal states in which a subject not only entertains a given propositional 
content, but also takes some positive stance with respect to its truth. For 
Ockham, therefore, as for other medievals, a judgment is a type of mental 
state that includes attitudes such as belief, knowledge, opinion, doubt, 
faith, and so on.2 
1 Citations of Ockham's Latin texts are to Ockham (1967-88). I rely on works from 
both the Opera Philosophica (=OPh) and the Opera Theologica (=OTh). I use the 
following abbreviations in referring to particular volumes: 
Expos.Perih. = Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis 
Expos.Phys. = Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis 
Ord. = Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum 
Quodl. = Quodlibeta Septem 
Qq.Phys. = Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis 
Rep. = Reportatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum 
SL = Summa Logicae 
Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine. 
2 Like other medieval thinkers, Ockham distinguishes between two types of propo- 
sitional attitude: judicative (which belong to intellect) and appetitive (which belong 
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There is a longstanding interpretation according to which Ockham 
holds, throughout his career, the view that certain mind-dependent 
entities - what he calls 'mental propositions' (propositiones in mente) or 
'complex concepts' (complexi) - serve as objects for belief, knowledge, 
and other propositional (or better, judicative) attitudes. On the surface, 
there is much to recommend this interpretation. In a number of texts, 
spanning the whole of his career, Ockham explicitly states that objects 
of judgment are mental entities. For example, he tells us in his commen- 
tary on Aristotle's Physics (a work that dates among his latest writings) 
that since 'all knowledge (scientia) is in relation to a [mental] proposition 
or propositions,' the objects known to us *by natural science are com- 
posed not of sensible things or substances, but of mental contents (inten- 
tiones) or concepts.'3 Indeed, because of remarks such as these, Ockham 
became notorious in his own day for defending a kind of anti-realist view 
about objects of judgment. What is more, because this position was 
regarded by his contemporaries and successors as highly implausible, it 
had the effect of generating widespread debate about the matter.4 
My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to show that the 
standard interpretation of Ockham's account of objects of judgment 
represents a misunderstanding: Ockham's commentators - both me- 
dieval and recent - have failed to appreciate the precise way in which 
his views about judgment evolve over the course of his career. In order 
to redress this failure, I undertake a systematic examination of Ockham's 
theory of judgment, identifying the various phases of its development 
and demonstrating that Ockham ultimately abandons the very view he 
became so notorious for defending. Second, I want to show that careful 
attention to the various stages in Ockham's thinking about judgment 
sheds new light on broader, and hitherto unnoticed, developments in his 
philosophy of mind. 
to will). Attitudes falling under the category of judgment all involve an attitude 
about the truth of a propositional content, and so comprise only a subset of possible 
propositional attitudes. Attitudes about the desirability of a given propositional 
content - attitudes such as desiring, wishing, and hoping are acts associated with 
the connative or desiderative power - that is, with the will. 
3 Expos.Phys. ProL, sec. 4 (OPh IV, 11). Cf. SL III-2, qq. 1-12 (OPh I, 505-526). 
4 For example, at University of Oxford, Walter Chatton, William Crathom, Robert 
Holcot, and Adam Wodeham (all of whom are near contemporaries of Ockham) 
take up the question about objects of judgment, and do so explicitly in reaction to 
Ockham. At Paris, Walter Burleigh, John Buridan, among others, discuss Ockham's 
views. See Brower-Toland 2002, Grassi 1990, and Nuchelmans 1973, chs. 12-14. 
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In some ways, the claim that Ockham's views about judgment and its 
objects evolve over time will not be news to those familiar with his 
philosophy. Commentators who have explicitly treated Ockham's ac- 
count of judgment have recognized that his account undergoes some 
development - specifically, a development occasioned by the well- 
known shift in his views about the nature of concepts.5 Thus, whereas in 
his early writings Ockham endorses a view according to which concepts 
are mind-dependent thought-objects called 'ficta,' in his most mature 
writings, he rejects this view in favor of a 'mental-act theory/ according 
to which concepts are not items distinct from and dependent on mental 
acts, but are rather identified with mental acts themselves.6 It is clear that 
this well-known shift in Ockham's account of concepts requires some sort 
of change in his account of the objects of judgment, since he takes the 
mental propositions that serve as such objects to be complex concepts. 
Thus, to the extent that commentators have addressed the issue explic- 
itly, they have typically inferred that Ockham develops two accounts of 
judgment - one corresponding to each of his two accounts of concepts.7 
In what follows, I argue that, as tempting as it is, this picture is 
inaccurate on several counts. In the first place, Ockham develops not two 
but three theories of judgment. What is more, the developments in his 
theory of judgment, while importantly connected to changes in his 
account of concepts, must be understood in terms of a broader and more 
fundamental shift in his views about the nature of intentionality itself. 
5 'Concept7 translates the Latin expression conceptus (literally, what is thought or 
conceived). The medieval notion of a concept corresponds roughly to the early modern 
notion of an idea - which isn't to say that there is any more agreement among 
medieval authors than among early modern about the precise nature of such 
entities. In fact, there are interesting parallels (and perhaps historical connections) 
between medieval disputes about the nature of concepts and early modern disputes 
about the nature of ideas. 
6 Ockham's writings on concepts have been divided into three main periods: An early 
period during which he advanced \hefictum theory, a middle period during which 
Ockham defends both the fictum and the mental act theory as equally plausible 
views, and a later period during which Ockham wholly endorses the mental-act 
theory. The earliest drafts of his Sentences commentary - that is, his Reportatio 
commentary and the early draft of his Ordinatio - belong to the early period. To 
the middle period belong his later additions to the Ordinatio commentary and his 
commentary on the Perihermenias. The Quodlibetal Questions, the Questions on the 
Physics, and the Summa Logicae all belong to the last period. For relative dating of 
these texts, see Boehner 1946 and 1951 and Leff 1975, ch. 2. 
7 For two recent examples of this sort of interpretation, see Karger 1995, 171-96 and 
Pasnau 1997, 285-9. Karger and Pasnau diverge, however, in their characterization 
what these two theories are. See Section II below 
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Indeed, it is this very shift in Ockham's account of intentionality that, I 
shall argue, ultimately underlies his move from the fictum to the mental- 
act account of concepts. Thus, in addition to correcting a longstanding 
misinterpretation of Ockham's theory of judgment, I also take myself to 
be filling an important lacuna in the contemporary literature surround- 
ing Ockham's account of concepts.8 For, while scholars are well aware 
that Ockham's views about concepts figure prominently in his thinking 
about a wide range of philosophical issues, little attention has been given 
to the precise way in which his views about concepts are connected to 
his views about judgment and about intentionality. As will emerge, 
however, a complete account of the developments in Ockham's views 
about concepts requires us to view them from the vantage point of his 
thinking about judgment and about intentionality generally. 
The paper is divided into four sections. In Section I, I examine Ock- 
ham's earliest treatment of judgment in his Ordinatio commentary - 
focusing in particular on the relation between it and his early, fictum-the- 
ory of concepts. Here I argue that Ockham's early views about both 
concepts and judgment are motivated by what I call a 'relational analy- 
sis' of intentionality. Having established the relationship between Ock- 
ham's early theory of judgment and his views about both concepts and 
intentionality, I go on, in the remainder of the paper, to examine how 
these connections bear on subsequent developments in his thinking 
about judgment. In Section II, I focus on Ockham's commentary on De 
Interpretatione where he develops his second or 'intermediate' theory of 
judgment; and in Section III, I examine Ockham's third and most mature 
discussion of judgment in his Quodlibetal Questions.9 As will become clear 
8 The literature on Ockham's account of concepts is vast - and for good reason. Not 
only is the relative dating of many works in Ockham's philosophical and theological 
corpus established by reference to developments in his account of concepts, but also 
Ockham's account of concepts is central to his defense of a number of his most 
characteristic doctrines including his nominalism in metaphysics and his direct 
realism in epistemology. As a result, Ockham's rejection oificta and subsequent 
move to the mental-act has been discussed extensively in contemporary Ockham 
scholarship. Typically, the shift is explained as motivated by his coming to be 
convinced, largely under pressure from his fellow Franciscan, Walter Chatton, that 
such entities are both metaphysically suspect and a threat to a direct realist account 
of perception. For a representative account of this see Adams 1977. 1 return to this 
issue in Section IV. 
9 Thus the texts on which I rely for the three-fold development in Ockham's account 
of judgment are the same as those through which scholars have traced the three- 
stage development in his account of concepts. See note 4 above for the relative dating 
of these texts. 
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from my discussion in these two sections, if we want to understand 
Ockham's views about judgment, we cannot, as his commentators have 
often supposed, merely look to changes in his account of concepts. On 
the contrary, we must look to the development in his attitude toward the 
relational analysis of intentionality. For, in the end, it is Ockham's views 
about the nature of intentionality that shape his account of both concepts 
and judgment. 
In the fourth and final section of the paper, I call attention to a final, 
systematic virtue of my interpretation. In particular, I argue that, in 
addition to making the best sense of the texts, my interpretation has the 
added benefit of resolving some outstanding difficulties for the received 
account of Ockham's transition from the fictum to the mental-act theory 
of concepts. 
I Ockham's early theory of judgment 
Ockham's account of judgment forms one part of a much broader theory 
about the nature and types of human cognition. In order to understand 
his early account of judgment, therefore, it will be useful to begin by 
situating it within this broader framework. 
1. Intentional Acts: Judgment, Apprehension, and 
Other Mental States 
Like many later medieval philosophers, Ockham conceives of mental 
states as concrete mental particulars, claiming that they are a type of 
Aristotelian accident that inheres in the mind or soul as their subject. As 
he explains, 'an act of intellection' - that is, an act of intellectual 
cognition - 'and, in general, every accident that informs the soul is a 
true quality in just the way that heat or whiteness is.'10 Mental acts or 
states are, thus accidents that fall in the Aristotelian category of Quality. 
It should be noted at this point that although it is standard for medie- 
val philosophers to speak of belief, knowledge, and other cognitive states 
as mental acts, in so speaking they don't mean by 'act' activity or action 
but something more like actualization.11 Medieval authors refer to belief 
10 Ord. d.2, q.8 (OTh II, 273). Ockham's Ordinatio d.2, qq. 4-8 can be found in English 
translation in Ockham 1994, 114-231. I adopt, with some modification, Spade's 
translations of the relevant passages from Ord. d.2, q.8. 
1 1 Philosophers have sometimes worried that speaking of mental 'acts' is problematic 
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and knowledge as mental 'acts' because, on their view, to believe or to 
know something is to actualize certain cognitive or rational capacities. 
An act of belief (or of cognition generally), therefore, is not to be under- 
stood as a mental activity per se, but rather as something more like an 
occurent mental state.12 
Ockham distinguishes among several different types of mental act, 
including intellective, volitional, and sensory. For our purposes, in what 
follows, we will be concerned only with his account of intellective states 
{intellectiones), which can be thought of roughly as states of thinking or 
conceiving. In the prologue of his Ordinatio, Ockham claims that all 
intellective acts or states fall into one of two categories: apprehension or 
judgment. As he explains: 
(A) There are two kinds of act [to be distinguished] among the intellect's acts. The 
first is an act of apprehension and it relates to everything that terminates an act 
of the intellective power, whether this be something complex or something 
non-complex. For we apprehend not only things which are non-complex, but 
also propositions (propositiones), demonstrations, impossibilities, necessities, 
and, in general, anything that is regarded by the intellective power. The second 
type of act may be called an act of judgment. It is that act by which the intellect 
not only apprehends its object, but also gives its assent or dissent to it. This act 
is only in relation to a proposition (complexi). For our intellect does not assent 
to anything unless we consider it to be true and it does not dissent from 
anything unless we judge it to be false. And so it is clear that, with respect to a 
proposition (complexi), there can be two acts, namely an act of apprehension 
and an act of judgment.13 
inasmuch as it suggests that belief, knowledge, and other such attitudes are a type 
of activity or action. Thus, for example, John Searle has objected to the notion of 
mental acts on the grounds that this conception is 'at best false, and at worst 
hopelessly confused/ As Searle explains, 'acts are things one does, but there is no 
answer to the question "What are you now doing?" which goes, "I am now 
believing it will rain" or "hoping taxes will be lowered" or "fearing a fall in the 
interest rate"' (Searle, 1983, 3). By clarifying medieval terminology I mean to fend 
off worries of this sort. 
12 So understood, these mental qualities or acts are entities of discrete and relatively 
short duration since, in general, occurent conscious states (such as cognizing, 
willing, judging and the like) are of discrete and relatively short duration. Although 
medieval thinkers typically speak of cognizing, believing, and other psychological 
states or attitudes as 'acts' and, hence, as occurent states, they also recognize another 
type of mental state or quality - what they call a 'habit.' These qualities are of much 
longer duration and, unlike mental acts, which are conscious mental states, they are 
unconscious, dispositional mental states. Habits are, on Ockham's view, produced 
by acts and remain in the mind long after them as dispositions for similar conscious 
acts. Since such habits are, on Ockham's view, not mere potentialities, but rather 
first actualities, there is a sense in which they too can be called 'acts.' 
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As this passage makes clear, Ockham's distinction between apprehen- 
sion and judgment is drawn in part by the type of object to which such 
acts relate. Acts of apprehension, he tells us, may be directed at either 
'complex' or 'non-complex' objects - which, I take it, is just his way of 
saying that they can be either propositional or non-propositional in 
content. Judicative attitudes are, by contrast, always propositional in 
content - hence, Ockham's claim that such states occur 'only in relation 
to a proposition.'14 
Apprehension and judgment differ not only with respect to their 
objects, however, but also with respect to the specific mode of awareness 
or psychological attitude they involve. Ockham takes apprehension to 
be a mental state in which the intellect neutrally considers some object 
without taking any definite attitude toward it, whereas judgment is a 
state in which 'the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives 
its assent or dissent to it/ Indeed, as Ockham goes on to point out, the 
further attitude involved in judgment always concerns the truth or 
falsity of what is judged. This explains why apprehension and judgment 
are individuated, at least in part, by their objects. One can neutrally 
consider something that is either propositional or non-propositional in 
content, but insofar as acts of judgment involve an attitude toward the 
truth or falsity of what is judged, they are distinctively propositional acts 
or attitudes.15 
Throughout his career, Ockham characterizes intellective acts or states 
in terms of their essential aboutness - that is to say, in terms of their 
13 Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh I, 16). Selections from q. 1 of the Ordinatio prologue can be found 
in English translation in Ockham 1990, 18-25. 
14 As it turns out, apprehension and judgment are each a type of mental state admitting 
of further subdivision. As Ockham indicates in passage (A), for example, judgment 
may be divided into assent and dissent - where assent is an attitude of affirming 
the truth of the apprehended object and dissent is an attitude that denies the truth 
of the object. Acts of assent and dissent can, moreover, be further divided into more 
specific propositional attitudes such as knowing, believing, opining, doubting and 
so on. Apprehension can, likewise, be further subdivided. As passage (A) makes 
clear, some apprehensions are propositional apprehensions (namely, acts of enter- 
taining propositional contents), but other apprehensions are non-propositional. In 
fact, Ockham goes on later in his discussion in the Ordinatio prologue, to distinguish 
between two types of non-propositional (intellective) apprehension: 'intuitive' and 
'abstractive' cognition. 
15 It may be that there is distinction to be drawn between acts and attitudes according 
to which acts are occurent mental events of discrete duration, whereas attitudes are 
longstanding states or dispositions. Nevertheless, since nothing I say turns on such 
a distinction I use the terms interchangeably. 
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intentionality. Indeed, as he puts it at one point: 'it is a contradiction to 
suppose that there is an act of thinking (intellectio) in the intellect without 
there being something that is thought (intelligatur).'16 Yet while Ockham 
always insists that intellective acts are essentially intentional, we shall 
see that his analysis of what their intentionality consists in changes over 
time. Early on, Ockham takes for granted that the intentionality of 
mental states is to be analyzed straightforwardly as a relation, namely, 
a relation between a mental act on the one hand, and some object on the 
other. This view is perhaps nowhere more evident than in passage (A) 
above where Ockham characterizes apprehension and judgment as acts 
that 'relate to' or 'terminate at' certain types of object; indeed, as we've 
just seen, he thinks such acts are individuated in part by the kind of object 
to which they relate. Thus, his early account of the intentionality of 
mental acts constitutes what, for convenience sake, we might call a 
'relational analysis' of intentionality since it analyzes intentionality as a 
relation between intentional acts, on the one hand, and certain objects, 
on the other. 
This sort of analysis of intentionality is familiar in the history of 
philosophy.17 And there is no difficulty seeing what would have at- 
tracted Ockham to it. Such an analysis provides both a natural charac- 
terization of the aboutness of thought and a straightforward means for 
individuating mental states. Indeed, if we reflect on the nature of inten- 
tional states it seems perfectly natural to render them in terms of the two 
elements to which Ockham's early analysis appeals: their content (i.e., 
this act is a thought of a square, that act is a thought of a circle), and the 
particular psychological attitude they involve (this act is an act of merely 
entertaining the thought that a square is not a rectangle, that act is the act 
of believing that a square is not a rectangle). It is not surprising, therefore, 
that in the discussion following that quoted in passage (A), Ockham goes 
on to defend his analysis of intentional states along just these lines: 
16 Quod/. IV, q.35(O77i DC, 473). 
17 The literature treating of this sort of view both historically, and non-historically is 
vast. Perhaps one of the best discussions is to be found in David Woodruff-Smith 
and Ronald Mclntire 1982, ch. 2. Using different terminology (their preferred label 
is 'object-theory of intentionality/ but the view itself is the same; see p. 42) they trace 
this view in the early Brentano and Meinong drawing comparisons to Frege along 
the way. Sellars (1963, 41ff.) traces this sort of view in early modern period and in 
early 20th century period. Other useful discussions of this sort of approach to 
intentionality include: Addis 1989, 34-42; Aquila 1977, ch. 2; Haldane 1989, 1-32; 
McDowell 1998, 476 ff. 
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(B) I hold that an act is distinguished by its object, since it is always the case that a 
specific distinction among acts follows from a distinction among objects - as 
when objects are apprehended by one of these acts and not by another. It does 
not follow from the identity of the object, however, that there is an identity of 
acts. For example, if A is an object of an act of thinking (intellectionis) and B is 
an object of an act of willing, it follows that thinking of A and willing B are 
distinct acts.18 
Nowadays, we customarily distinguish between different kinds or as- 
pects of intentionality - in particular, between what we might call 
content intentionality (a mental state's having representational content) 
and referential intentionality (a mental state's being directed at or about a 
given object).19 As it turns out, Ockham eventually comes to mark this 
sort of distinction, but in his early discussions of intentional acts, he 
seems not to be aware of it. Indeed, the way he initially individuates 
intentional acts - that is, just in terms their object and psychological 
attitude - is evidence of this. As we've seen, Ockham holds that what 
distinguishes one mental act from another involving the same attitude 
is its content, but then he appears to simply take for granted that a mental 
act's having a given content consists in its being directed at or related to 
some object. 
Before turning to Ockham's early discussion of intentional objects, I 
need to call attention to one final feature of his account of intentional acts 
- namely, his analysis of the relations that obtain among the various 
types of mental act. For, in the Ordinatio prologue, immediately after 
introducing the distinction between apprehension and judgment, Ock- 
ham proceeds to argue for a certain ordering among the intellect's 
various acts. He begins by arguing that acts of apprehension are logically 
prior to acts of judgment: 
(C) An act of judgment relating to some proposition presupposes an act of appre- 
hension relating to the same proposition.... And this act of apprehending can 
18 Ord.Prol.,q.l(O77zI,62). 
19 I am here adopting terminology used by Kim (1996, 21), but the distinction is one 
common to discussions of intentionality and has been expressed in a variety of ways 
by a variety of philosophers. Crane (2001, 6-33) who (following Searle) labels these 
two elements of an intentional state its 'aspectual shape' and 'directedness' respec- 
tively. Haugland (1990, 384) expresses it by pointing out that 'that something's 
content is not the same as what it is about or represents.' More historically (e.g. 
especially among members of the Brentano school), the distinction has been drawn 
simply as a distinction between the content and the object of intentional states. See, 
for example, Findlay 1963, ch. 1; Jan Wolenki 1998/99, 15-35; Woodruff-Smith and 
Mclntyre 1982, ch. 3. 
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exist without an act of judgment, but not vice-versa. Therefore, apprehension 
is naturally prior [to judgment] - the former presupposes the latter.20 
According to Ockham, every judgment presupposes a logically prior act 
of apprehending, since in order to form a judgment regarding some 
content one must first apprehend what is to be judged. 
Along the same lines, Ockham claims that propositional apprehen- 
sions presuppose, in their turn, certain 'simple' acts of apprehension - 
that is, apprehension or grasp of the non-propositional 'terms' or con- 
ceptual constituents of the proposition apprehended. Thus, on his view, 
the occurrence of any given act of judgment will always involve several 
(logically) prior acts of apprehension. As he says: 
(D) Every act of judgment presupposes in the same faculty a non-propositional 
grasp of its terms; for it presupposes an act of apprehending [a proposition] 
and the act of apprehending a proposition presupposes a non-propositional 
grasp of the terms of that proposition.21 
On Ockham's early account, therefore, judgment is a complex psycho- 
logical event - one involving a network of relations among various 
intellective acts and objects. 
2. Intentional Objects: Concepts, Ficta, and Objects of judgment 
Thus far, we have been focusing on Ockham's early account of inten- 
tional acts. I want to turn now to examine his account of the objects of 
such acts. Ockham's early account of intentional objects is driven by a 
problem associated with the relational analysis of intentionality. On this 
analysis, as we've seen, every act of thinking relates to an object. Indeed, 
as Ockham himself points out, for any given mental act one may ask: 'Is 
something understood by this cognition - or is nothing understood?' 
In response, he argues: 
(E) It cannot be said that nothing is. For in just the way that it is impossible that 
there should be vision and nothing seen, or that there should be desire and 
nothing desired, so also it is impossible that there should be a cognition and 
nothing cognized by that cognition.22 
20 Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh 1, 17-8). 
21 Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh I, 21). 
22 'Non potest dici quod nihil, quia sicut impossible est esse visionem et nihil videri, 
vel esse dilectionem et nihil diligi, ita impossibile est esse cognitionem et nihil 
cognosci ilia cognitione/ Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 6 (OPh II, 352). 
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As Ockham recognizes, this analysis of thought gives rise to certain 
puzzles. In cases where thought is about what exists, there is perhaps 
little difficulty in accounting for the objects of thought. But what is to be 
said about those cases in which we think of what doesn't exist? To what 
are mental acts related in such cases? 
This problem, the so-called 'problem of intentionality/ arises directly 
out of Ockham's commitment to the relational analysis of intentionality 
and is perhaps as familiar as the relational analysis itself.23 The problem 
is one that emerges directly from Ockham's commitment to three intui- 
tive theses about thought (the first of which is just a statement of the 
relational analysis itself): 
(i) Thinking consists in a relation between an act of thinking and 
what is thought of. 
(ii) Relations entail the existence of their relata. 
(iii) We can (and sometimes do) think of what does not exist. 
The difficulty, of course, is that the conjunction of the first and the third 
claims entails that thought can be related to non-existent things, whereas 
the second denies this. 
Now, in order to see how Ockham resolves the problem of intention- 
ality, we need to turn to his early discussion of universals at Question 2, 
article 8 of the Ordinatio (hereafter, 'Q.2.8'). It should not be surprising 
that Ockham addresses the problem of intentionality in the context of 
his treatment of universals, since while Ockham would certainly not 
deny that we have thoughts that are universal in content, he does deny 
that universals exist.24 Thus at the outset of the question, Ockham 
observes that 'in every act of thinking there is something that is thought,' 
adding a bit later that 'that which terminates an act of thinking is what 
everyone calls the mind's 'concept' (conceptus)/25 But if there are no 
23 For a discussion of the problem of intentionality see, for example, Crane 2001 , 336-49 
and Harney 1984, ch. 1. A discussion of the issue among ancient thinkers can be 
found in Caston 1993 and 1998, 249-98. 
24 Not only does he deny that there are universals, but thinks that 'to suppose that 
there is something in extramental reality besides singulars is ... altogether absurd 
and destructive of the whole of Aristotelian philosophy and of all knowledge, all 
truth, and all reason. I believe it to be the worst error in philosophy/ Expos.Perih. 
Prol., sec. 8 (OPh H, 363). 
25 Ord. d.2, q.8 (OTh II, 268). 
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universals, what is the nature of that which is conceived (conceptus) by 
acts that are universal in content? It is this question that Ockham sets out 
to answer in Q.2.8. 
Although in this context Ockham raises the problem of intentionality 
specifically for universals, he is well aware that the problem arises for 
thought about non-existents generally - and, given his penchant for 
ontological parsimony, there are, for him, many such cases.26 Even so, 
his favorite examples to illustrate the problem involve purportedly 
abstract entities. Thus in Q.2.8, in addition to citing universals, he also 
mentions 'propositions, syllogisms, and other items with which logic 
deals' - all of which, according to Ockham, do not exist.27 As he 
explains: 'propositions, syllogisms and the like, [namely, those items] 
with which logic deals, do not have subjective [that is, true or genuine] 
reality.'28 Given Ockham's claim (in passage (A) and elsewhere) that acts 
of judgment relate to or terminate at propositions, his denial of the 
existence of propositions (and the like) renders the problem of intention- 
ality particularly acute in the case of judgment. 
Ockham's solution to the problem of intentionality is one that involves 
the introduction of a class of unreal, or intentionally existing, thought- 
objects - entities that he refers to alternatively as 'ficta,' 'objectively 
existing beings' (entia habentia tantum esse objectivum) or 'concepts of the 
26 Ockham is, of course, well known for his nominalism. In general, he appears willing 
to allow only concrete, particular things (res) falling in the category of substance and 
quality. Thus, he seems to deny the reality not only of universals, but also of 
abstracta including propositions (as they are nowadays conceived), and facts or 
states of affairs. There is, however, a good deal of debate in the scholarship about 
just what Ockham does and does not admit in his ontology. Thus, while some 
scholars, such as Normore (1999) argue that, in addition to certain qualities and 
theological relations, Ockham is committed only to presently existing individuals, 
others hold that his commitment extends beyond this. Panaccio (1999), for example, 
argues that Ockham is also committed to past, future, and merely possible individu- 
als. Spade (1999) goes so far as to claim that Ockham is even committed to certain 
properties or non-objectual entities. 
27 In addition to these sorts of examples, Ockham also cites cases such as thoughts 
about possible (but non-existing) objects - for example, the things that God thinks 
of before he creates - and thoughts about fictive objects such as chimeras and 
goat-stags. 
28 Ord. d.2, q.8 (OTh II, 273); C/. Ockham 1994, 219. Of course, Ockham admits that 
there are (what he refers to as) 'spoken and written propositions/ Thus in claiming 
that there are no propositions, he's denying that there is anything in the external 
world beyond substances and certain qualities that might serve as the correlate or 
ontological ground for judgment or propositional thought in general. 
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mind' (concepta mentis).29 A fictum, he tells us, 'has the aspect of an object 
and is what immediately terminates an act of intellective cognition 
(intelligendi) when no singular thing is cognized.'30 Although such 
thought-objects, according to Ockham, do not have real (or what he calls 
'subjective') existence, they do, nevertheless, possess a mode of existence 
that he variously refers to as 'objective,' 'intentional,' 'cognized,' or 
'fictive.'31 (Note that the medieval usage of the terms 'subjective' and 
'objective' existence runs counter to our current usage of these expres- 
sions. Thus, for Ockham and other medieval thinkers, an objectively 
existing being is an intentional or mind dependent being, where a 
subjectively existing being is one that exists independently of (human) 
minds.) As Ockham explains, 'they [i.e.ficta] have only objective being 
so that their being is their being cognized.'32 They are items that 'can be 
fashioned by the mind' as a kind of 'likeness, or image, or picture ... [or] 
'word' of a thing.'33 Ficta are, therefore, mental or mind-dependent, 
entities created by and immanently present to the mental states directed 
at them.34 
29 Some scholars have argued (see Adams 1977, 151 n.24 and Kelly 1978, 260-282) that 
the expression 'ficta' is not interchangeable with the expressions 'concept' and 
'objectively existing being.' According to these scholars, only a subset of concepts 
or objectively existing beings are ficta. While there are passages that suggest this 
reading, there are also passages in which he uses 'ficta' to refer to all intentional 
entities (cf. Quodl IV, q. 35). In addition, there is the fact that Ockham is quite explicit 
that the constituents of mental propositions are ficta, but there appears to be no 
restriction on what concepts can be combined by the intellect to form propositions. 
Although I shall continue to use these terms interchangeably, nothing in my 
argument turns on this usage. 
30 Ord. d.2, q.8 (OTh U, 268); Cf Ockham 1994, 220. 
31 Ord. d.2, q.8 (OTh II, 271-274). Cf. Expos.Perih. Prol, sec. 7 (OPh II, 360); Quodl. IV, q. 
35 (OPh IX, 469 ff.). 
32 Ord. d.2, q.8 (OTh U, 273). Cf Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 7 where Ockham argues that a 
fictum 'doesn't have being except by the operation of the mind.' As he explains, '[a 
fictum] can be called an intention of the mind in virtue of the fact that it isn't 
something real in the mind (in the way that, say, a habit is something real in the 
mind) but has only intentional being, that is, cognized being. And for the same 
reason it can be called a concept of the mind.' For a discussion of the relation between 
Ockham and Descartes' notion of objective being, see Normore 1987. 
33 Ord. d.2, q.8 (OTh U, 270); Cf. Ockham 1994, 222. 
34 In this respect, these entities are more akin to Berkelian ideas (although Ockham 
would not countenance Berkley's idealism) or to Brentano's 'intentionally inexistent 
objects' than to, say, Meinongian non-existent objects or contemporary notions of 
non-mental concepts. While there are some scholars (e.g., Adams (1987, chs. 11, 26) 
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In light of all this, we can see that Ockham's strategy for resolving the 
problem of intentionality, at least in his early writings, is to adopt a 
theory of concepts that allows him to preserve the relational analysis - 
that is, to preserve the first of the three theses listed at (i) - (iii) above. 
Doing so, however, also requires him to modify the second and third of 
these three theses. Thus, his version of (ii) amounts to something like: 
(ii*) relations entail either the subjective or the objective existence of 
their relata. 
And his version of (iii) is just: 
(iii*) We can (and sometimes do) think of what does not subjectively 
exist. 
Understood in this way, (i) - (iii) no longer raise any threat of inconsis- 
tency. 
While Ockham introduces ficta to serve as objects for all cases of 
thought of non-existents, he almost always focuses on them for cases of 
universal cognition and propositional attitudes.35 Indeed, in his later 
writings, Ockham admits that the initial motivation for positing/fcta was 
chiefly to account for thought about universals and propositions: '[a 
fictum] was postulated for no other reason than to stand for a thing in 
such a way that both a proposition might be composed out of it and it 
might be common to things/36 Thus, for him, the propositional objects 
that serve as relata of judgments (such as knowledge and belief) are just 
complex concepts - ficta brought together by the intellect to form a 
complex thought-object (complexum) or what Ockham frequently refers 
to as a 'mental proposition' (propositione in mente). 
and Read (1977)) who resist the idea that Ockham's ficta are mental or mind 
dependent entities I find little textual evidence to support such readings and much 
to argue against it. 
35 For example, at one point Ockham points out that 'it is clear that such a fictum is 
truly the object cognized by the intellect. Because of this it can be a term of a 
proposition and it can supposit for all things it is an image or likeness of. This is 
what it is to be universal and common to them' Ord. d.2 q.8 (OTh II, 279). Similarly, 
when Ockham discusses/i'cta in his commentary on De Interpretatione, he claims that: 
'[a fictum] terminates an act of understanding when some singular outside the mind 
is not understood and, nevertheless, something common is understood in external 
things.... Moreover, from these \ficta] propositions are formed-propositions that are 
known and understood/ Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 7 (OPh II, 360). 
36 Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 7 (OPh II, 360). Cf Qq.Phys. q.l (OPh VI, 398). 
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The fact that Ockham thinks of the objects of judgment as complex 
concepts explains something we saw earlier - namely, his analysis of 
the logical relations that obtain among various mental acts. On his early 
account, mental propositions are the product of a certain mental opera- 
tions that he refers to as 'composition/ According to Ockham: 'whatever 
the intellect can apprehend in a simple act of thinking, it can combine 
(componere) with another thing by saying 'this is that."37 What Ockham 
calls 'composition/ therefore, is just the mental state in which one forms 
or apprehends a mental proposition. Thus, the propositions that serve 
as objects of judgment are produced by and dependent on acts of 
apprehension - that is, on the acts by which one first forms or grasps, 
or 'composes' the proposition in question. In light of this, it is clear why 
Ockham supposes acts of judgment are (logically) posterior to various 
acts of apprehension. Without a (logically) prior apprehensive act of 
composition there is no propositional content toward which one might 
adopt a judicative attitude. Indeed, on his view, the act of assenting or 
dissenting depends on one's having first entertained a given proposi- 
tional content. Moreover, inasmuch as forming or apprehending a 
proposition in turn requires an apprehension or grasp of the simple 
concepts that comprise it, it follows that judgments likewise presuppose 
the occurrence of certain non-propositional apprehensions. Thus, it is 
Ockham's account of the nature of concepts - his view that they are 
entities produced by and dependent on acts of apprehension - that 
motivates his views (stated in passages (C) and (D) above) about the 
logical ordering among acts of judging and apprehending. 
3. From Ficta to Mental Acts 
We can now see that Ockham's early theory of judgment is intimately 
connected to his early views about intentional acts and intentional 
objects in general. Indeed, it is his relational analysis of intentionality 
that leads him to introduce the ficta that serve as the objects for judgment 
in the first place. As I noted at the outset, however, Ockham comes to 
have second thoughts about the fictum theory of concepts. The catalyst 
37 Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh II, 49). 
38 Ockham's claims about the ordering among mental acts pertain only to the natural 
order. He allows that it is possible, by divine absolute power, for an act of judgment 
to be produced without any prior act of apprehension. See, Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh n, 
57ff.). 
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for this change of heart appears to have been Ockham's junior colleague 
at Oxford, a philosopher and theologian by the name of Walter Chatton, 
who vigorously criticized the fictum theory.39 Chatton raises a number 
of objections to fict a - all of which are designed to show that such entities 
are (a) ontologically superfluous, and (b) epistemologically problematic. 
In connection with the first point, Chatton argues that mental acts alone 
can play any role allotted to ficta: 'a [mental] act/ he says, 'is just as 
sufficient for representing something as a fictum is/40 In connection with 
the second point, he maintains that/zcta are unacceptable intermediaries 
that get in the way of our direct cognition of extramental reality.41 
Accordingly, when Chatton turns to his own account of concepts, he 
argues that 'there is no mediating, fictive being that immediately termi- 
nates a [mental] act ... there is only the act of thinking itself/42 
As is well known, Ockham eventually comes to accept these criticisms 
of \he fictum theory, and indeed to advance them (in some cases, almost 
word for word) as his own grounds for accepting the mental-act theory. 
He does not, however, arrive at the mental-act view all at once. On the 
contrary, for an intermediate period he regards it (along with one other 
alternative) as merely an equally plausible alternative to the fictum 
account.43 It is only in his most mature writings that Ockham finally and 
wholeheartedly abandons ficta. 
It is clear that this development in Ockham's thinking about concepts 
has significant implications both for his views about judgment and its 
objects as well as for his account of intentionality generally. That it has 
implications for his account of intentionality generally will become clear 
39 For a fuller discussion of Chatton's criticisms of Ockham and his role in Ockham's 
eventual change of mind see Gal 1967, Kelly 1981 and Tachau 1988, ch.7. 
40 Chatton 2002 (Reportatio I d.3, q.2, 234). 
41 M., 234-5. 
42 This quotation comes from the Lectura version of I d.3, q.2. See Gal 1967, 204 n. 26. 
43 Thus, Ockham says of both the fictum and mental-act theories T think they are 
plausible. Nevertheless, let the studious folks (studiosi) settle which is true and 
which false/ Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 10 (OPh II, 371) Actually, at this stage, Ockham 
is willing to grant three different possible views about the nature of concepts. Thus, 
in addition to the mental-act and fictum view (discussed in sections 6 and 7 of the 
Prologue, respectively) he expresses a willingness (in section 4) to also allow the 
view that a concept 'is some kind of mental quality - one that is really distinct from 
the act of thinking, and that terminates the act of thinking itself as its object and 
which, in fact, exists only when there is an act of thinking' (OPh II, 349). The only 
view he explicitly rules out as 'irrational' is the view that a concept is a species - a 
view many of his contemporaries held. 
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as we go, but its implications for his account of judgment can be seen 
already. After all, on the fictum theory of concepts, acts of judgment take 
propositions as their objects, and propositions in turn are construed as 
complex ficta. lificta are abandoned in favor of a mental-act theory of 
concepts, Ockham must revise his account to explain what, in the ab- 
sence of ficta, serves as objects of judgment. 
While scholars have generally recognized that Ockham is forced to 
modify his early theory of judgment in light of his changing theory of 
concepts, there is some disagreement as to what these modifications 
involve. Since the time of Ockham, most commentators have regarded 
him as holding fixed throughout his career the view that acts of judgment 
relate to mental entities - that is, to complex concepts, or mental 
propositions. Thus, the majority of commentators (including his own 
contemporaries and successors) would agree with the assumption made 
by Robert Pasnau (1997, 285-9) that the only modification Ockham 
makes to his early theory occurs in his account of the nature of mental 
propositions themselves - so that, whereas on the early theory, judica- 
tive attitudes relate to mental propositions understood as complex/zcta, 
on the later theory such attitudes relate to mental propositions under- 
stood as complex mental acts.44 Other commentators, however, have 
thought they could detect a more radical revision in Ockham's later 
theory. Elizabeth Karger (1995, 171-96), for example, claims that when 
Ockham jettisons ficta he also abandons his early view that all acts of 
judgment relate to propositions.45 
In light of what we've seen so far of Ockham's broader views about 
intentionality, Karger's account of the shift from ficta to mental acts 
would seem to carry with it a certain prima facie plausibility. This is 
because the mental-act account of concepts, at least on the face of it, 
appears to involve a rejection of the relational analysis of intentionality. 
After all, since it is Ockham's commitment to a relational analysis that 
leads him to introduce/i'cta in the first place, it is natural to suppose that 
44 Other scholars who appear to take a similar line include: Adams (1987, ch. 26), 
Kretzmann (1970, 780-1), Nuchelmans (1973, 198), and Tachau (1988, chs. 5, 7 and 
10). Although none of these authors explicitly treat the changes in Ockham's 
thinking about judgment, their discussions make clear that they assume that Ock- 
ham held - throughout his career - the view that judicative attitudes relate to 
mental propositions. As I indicated at the outset, Ockham's own contemporaries 
and successors also appear to read him as Pasnau does. 
45 John Boler (1976, 88) also seems to gesture at this interpretation. As will become 
clear, Ockham - even in his most mature writings on judgment - continues to 
maintain that there is a sense in which some types of judicative attitude can be said to 
take propositions as object. I return to this complication in section III.2 below. 
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for him to reject ficta is tantamount to a rejection of the relational analysis 
itself - especially since he never introduces any other sort of entity to 
serve as the object for thoughts involving non-existent entities (and 
Ockham never wavers on his refusal to admit universals, propositions, 
etc. as mind independent entities).46 If this is right, and if the mental-act 
account amounts to a rejection of the relational analysis of intentionality, 
then we would expect Ockham also to abandon a relational analysis of 
judicative attitudes and so, as Karger maintains, to radically revise his 
early account of the objects of judgment. 
Unfortunately, matters are not so simple. As we shall see, there is 
considerable textual evidence to suggest that, pace Karger, Ockham 
initially continues to maintain his early view that propositions are 
objects for all judicative attitudes - even in contexts in which he is 
expressly presupposing a mental-act theory of concepts. Such evidence 
certainly lends weight to the more traditional reading - that is, to the 
reading advanced by Pasnau and others. But if Ockham continues to 
hold that all judicative attitudes take mental propositions as their object, 
it would appear he doesn't abandon the relational analysis after all. 
In the remainder of the paper, I show how these interpretive discrep- 
ancies disappear once it is recognized that Ockham develops not two but 
three accounts of judgment over the course of his career: one in connec- 
tion with his early fictum theory of concepts and then two more in 
connection with the mental-act theory. As we shall see, the reason for the 
two-fold development in connection with the mental-act theory owes to 
the fact that Ockham does not immediately see how to amend his early 
theory of judgment to accommodate the mental-act account of concepts. 
Indeed, when Ockham first begins to consider and develop the mental- 
act theory (that is, during the intermediate period in which he is neutral 
between it and the fictum theory) he continues to hold a relational 
analysis of intentionality - at least when it comes to his analysis of 
judicative attitudes. In fact, what is most distinctive about what I shall 
call the 'intermediate theory of judgment' is that it embodies a kind of 
disjunctive analysis of intentionality: Ockham is willing to reject the 
relational analysis of intentionality for some intentional states, but then 
46 Understood in this way, the difference between the fictum and the mental-act 
account of concepts is the difference between two views of intentionality: on the 
former view, Ockham analyzes intentionality relationally - a thought's having 
content is analyzed as a relation between the mental act itself and a certain object; 
on the latter view, he rejects the relational analysis and so analyzes intentionality 
non-relationally - or, we might say, adverbially - a thought's having content is 
nothing other than a mental act's being contentful in a certain way. 
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retains it in his analysis of others. That Ockham should adopt this 
disjunctive account of intentionality is, of course, puzzling - and, 
eventually, I'll need to say something about why he might have come to 
such a view. 
II Ockham's Intermediate theory of judgment 
Ockham's earliest attempt to modify his view of the objects of judgment 
in order to accommodate a mental-act account of concepts is found in 
the prologue of his commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. In the 
prologue of the commentary, Ockham surveys a variety of views one 
might hold about the nature of concepts. While this survey is not 
restricted to ihefictum and mental-act view, these two views receive the 
most attention. It is in the context of this early treatment of the mental-act 
account of concepts that Ockham develops what I am calling his 'inter- 
mediate' theory of judgment.47 
1. The Context: 
A Challenge for the Mental- Act Theory of Concepts 
In Section 6 of the De Interpretatione prologue, Ockham presents the 
mental-act theory of concepts and offers a limited defense of it. In the 
course of this discussion, he considers a number of objections that might 
be raised to the theory and then goes on to provide what he takes to be 
the best response available to one wishing to hold this view. Among the 
objections he considers is one that specifically challenges the mental-act 
theorist to explain what, in the absence oificta, serves as the object for 
acts of judgment. Although the challenge is stated specifically in terms 
of objects of judgment, the problem it poses is perfectly general (and by 
now also familiar) - namely, how, on the mental-act theory of concepts, 
the problem of intentionality is to be resolved. 
47 In the prologue of his commentary, Ockham begins by calling attention to Aristotle's 
claim that words primarily signify concepts ('passiones mentis') and then proceeds 
to note that there is considerable debate about 'what kind of thing a concept is/ 
While acknowledging that questions about the nature of concepts do not pertain 
directly to the broadly logical issues with which Aristotle is concerned in the De 
Interpretatione, Ockham takes the issue up anyway saying that '[while this] does not 
pertain to logic but to the considerations of metaphysics, nevertheless, I want to go 
over some opinions that can be held on this difficult matter/ Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 
3 (OPh H, 349). 
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The objector puts the challenge as follows: 'Consider/ he says, 'the act 
of knowing a proposition. I ask what is understood by such an act?' The 
objector then proceeds to argue that the only way to account for the object 
of this act is to introduce some sort of mind-dependent entity to serve as 
object. For, as he explains, the object for such an act 
(E) Is either [1] something simple or [2] something composite. But it is not [1] 
something simple, since every proposition is at the very least composed of a 
subject and a predicate and a copula. But if it is [2] something composite, I ask 
this: from what is this proposition composed? Either it is composed entirely 
out of [2a] things in extramental reality (res) - in which case the proposition 
would exist in extramental reality and not only in the intellect. Or it is composed 
from [2b] things in the intellect, [in which case it is either composed from [2bj] 
acts of understanding, or from [2bu] other things in the intellect.] But it cannot 
be composed from [2bJ acts of understanding, since [if it were composed 
entirely of such acts], then, in addition to the act of understanding the propo- 
sition, there would also be the other acts from which the proposition is com- 
posed. And, if this were the case, there would be many acts existing 
simultaneously. Therefore, [2bu] some other thing is understood by the act of 
understanding, which is nevertheless [composed from things] in the intellect.48 
Essentially, the objector's strategy is to prove that the mental-act account 
of concepts must be abandoned in favor of a view positing some sort of 
mental object beyond the acts themselves. The argument may be sum- 
marized as follows: 
(1) Thinking (e.g. understanding or knowing) consists in a relation 
between an act of thinking and what is thought of. (The relational 
analysis of intentionality) 
(2) Hence, objects of propositional acts (such as knowing) are com- 
plex or propositional in nature. 
(3) Such complex, propositional objects must be composed either 
from things in extramental reality or from things in the mind. 
(4) They cannot be composed of things in extramental reality (since 
this would entail that there are propositions in the world). 
(5) Hence, they must be composed from things in the mind. 
(6) If they are composed from things in the mind, they must be 
composed either of mental acts or other mental items. 
48 Expos.Perih. Pro!., sec. 6 (OPh II, 354). 
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(7) But they cannot be composed of mental acts (since this would 
entail the simultaneous existence of several mental acts - 
namely, the act of judging or knowing a proposition, and the acts 
of apprehension that comprise the propositional object).49 
(8) Hence, they must be composed of other mental items. 
The objector doesn't specify in his conclusion what kind of mental items 
propositional contents must be composed of - whether ficta or some- 
thing else. But the argument is clearly pushing in the direction of 
something like ihefictum view. 
Ockham's response to this objection begins by drawing attention to an 
ambiguity in the objector's question. The objector asks about 'what is 
understood by an act of knowing a proposition' and so appears to waiver 
between asking about the nature of the objects of (propositional) under- 
standing (i.e., acts of propositional apprehension), on the one hand, and 
about the nature of the objects of knowledge (i.e., acts of judgment), on the 
other. To this, Ockham responds by pointing out that 'it is important 
whether we are speaking of the act of knowing a proposition or of an act 
of apprehending a proposition' - thereby intending to leave open that 
the question can be answered differently depending on which type of 
mental act we have in mind. 
It is puzzling that Ockham should emphasize the distinction between 
apprehension and judgment at this point - we would expect that 
whatever account he gives of the objects of propositional attitudes, it's 
going to be the same regardless of whether the attitude in question is one 
of apprehending or one of judging. As it turns out, however, this is not 
the case. Indeed, Ockham insists that if the argument is interpreted as 
applying to apprehension, it goes wrong for one reason, but if it is 
interpreted as applying to judgment, it goes wrong for another. As will 
become clear, Ockham's response to the objection embodies a kind of 
disjunctive analysis of intentional states, one that pertains to apprehen- 
sion, another to judgment. In the end, I will suggest that Ockham's 
acceptance of such a disjunctive analysis has to do with his failure to be 
consistently clear about two different kinds of intentionality (namely, 
content vs. referential intentionality) and that this, in turn, is what leads 
him to analyze different kinds of mental state differently. 
49 There was considerable debate (both before Ockham and after him) about whether 
there can be more than one mental act in the intellect at a time. As we shall see, 
Ockham finds nothing worrisome about granting this possibility. 
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To see this, we need to begin by looking at his response to the objection 
as it applies to apprehension. 
2. Intermediate Theory of Apprehension 
As applied to apprehension, we can think of the objection as challenging 
Ockham to provide some account of the objects of propositional appre- 
hensions. If mind-dependant objects do not serve as the relata for such 
acts, then what does? Ockham's response runs as follows: 
(F) To apprehend a proposition is nothing other than to form a proposition. And 
when it is asked what is understood (intelligitur) by such a mental proposition 
- whether it is something simple or something composite - one can say that 
[it is] neither something simple nor something composite.50 
Ockham's remarks here are somewhat cryptic, but at least this much is 
clear: he wants to deny that acts of propositional apprehension have 
objects that are either simple or complex. What this means, of course, is 
that Ockham means to reject premise (2) of the objector's argument, 
namely, the claim that propositional apprehensions relate to complex, 
propositional objects. Thus, whereas in earlier discussions of apprehen- 
sion (e.g., in passage (A)) Ockham explicitly characterizes propositional 
apprehension in terms of its relation to something complex (complexi), 
here he abandons this view. 
Initially, Ockham's way of putting things seems puzzling, since to 
deny that a given mental act has a complex or propositional object 
suggests that the act in question is not propositional in content. Indeed, 
if we are assuming that a mental act's possessing content consists in its 
being related to a certain object, then to claim, as Ockham does here, that 
propositional apprehensions have neither simple nor complex objects 
would seem tantamount to claiming that propositional apprehensions 
are, as it were, empty. But clearly Ockham does not mean to commit 
himself to either claim - that is, either to the claim that propositional 
apprehensions are empty or to the claim that they are non-propositional 
in content (after all, he explicitly says that such apprehensions are 
apprehensions of propositions!) How, then, are we to make sense of 
Ockham's response to the objector's argument? 
50 '...apprehendere propositionem non est aliud quam formare propositionem. Et tune 
quando quaeritur quid intelligitur tali propositione in mente: aut simplex aut 
compositum? -potest dici quod nee simplex nee compositum' Expos.Perih. ProL, sec. 
6 (OPh H, 357). 
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The key lies in recognizing that Ockham's discussion in this passage, 
and, in particular, his rejection of premise (2) of the objector's argument 
is motivated by a more general alteration in his conception of intention- 
ality. Indeed, Ockham's rejection of premise (2) can be explained by the 
fact that he now means to reject premise (1) as well, namely, to reject the 
relational analysis of intentionality - at least for cases of apprehension. 
This, I take it, is the point of his claiming that 'to apprehend a proposition 
is nothing other than to form a proposition.' Since the very locution 
'apprehend a proposition' suggests a relation to a distinct, independent 
entity, Ockham means to draw attention away from it by recommending 
that we conceive of propositional apprehension as an act of 'forming' or 
'thinking' a propositional thought. Indeed, as Ockham understands the 
mental-act account of apprehension, to apprehend a proposition is not 
to stand in some intentional relation to a given object (whether simple 
or complex); rather it is just to possess an act (or, as we might say, to 
occupy a state) of the relevant sort, one which is, as it were, propositionally 
contentful. Ockham expresses all this a bit more clearly later in the 
prologue when he explains what it means, on the mental-act account, to 
say that we apprehend or understand propositions: 
(G) It should not be said that a mental proposition is understood [i.e., apprehended] 
in such a way that it is the terminus of an act of thinking.... If we take being 
understood (intelligi) as related to understanding (intellectionem) in a way similar 
to that in which being spoken (proferri) is related to an utterance (vocem), then 
[we can see that] just as to utter is to bring about a spoken word, similarly, to 
understand is to bring about or to possess an understanding.51 
Thus, when Ockham claims (as he does earlier in passage (F)) that 
propositional apprehensions do not have complex, propositional ob- 
jects, it is clear that what he means to deny is not that such apprehensions 
are propositional in content, but only that their having the content they 
do consists in a relation to some object - whether simple or complex. 
Although Ockham rejects premise (1) as applied to apprehension, it is 
important to note that he does, nevertheless, allow that there is a sense in 
which propositional apprehensions can be said to be directed at objects. 
In fact, in the text immediately following the passage quoted at (F), 
Ockham hastens to add that, when we entertain a propositionally con- 
tentful thought such as 'a human being is an animal,' there are certain 
51 '...non debet proprie loquendo concedi quod propositio in mente intelligitur ita 
quod terminet actum intelligendi...Sed accipiendo 'intelligi' ut similiter se habeat 
ad intellectionem sicut 'proferri' se habet ad vocem , ita quod sicut 'proferre' est 
causare vocem ita 'intelligere' sit causare vel habere intellectionem. Expos. Perth. 
Pro!., sec. 12 (OPh E, 375). 
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entities - namely, individual human beings and animals - to which 
the act relates. He is careful in this passage to indicate, however, that 
such objects in no way function as the content of the state: 
(H) Properly speaking, by the proposition 'a human being is an animal' neither a 
simple [object] nor a composite [object] is apprehended. Rather that mental 
proposition is an act of understanding by means of which every human and 
every animal is confusedly apprehended and [by means of which it is appre- 
hended] that a human is the same in number as an animal - since this is what 
is expressed (denotatur) by means of the proposition. Therefore, by this propo- 
sition many things are understood, yet not something that is composed [from 
them].52 
Here Ockham explains that although the apprehension (namely, the 
apprehension that a human being is an animal) relates to human beings 
and to animals as objects, what the act represents is 'that a human is the 
same in number as an animal' - and this (namely, the act's repre- 
sentational content), he maintains, 'is not something composed' from 
humans and animals. This distinction between what the propositional 
apprehension represents and what serves as its object shows fairly clearly 
that, at least in the case of propositional apprehension, Ockham is now 
committed to a distinction between a mental act's possessing repre- 
sentational content and its being related to or directed at certain objects. 
To the extent that Ockham is committed to this distinction between an 
act's having content and its relating to an object, he is also clearly 
committed to what I earlier referred to as the distinction between content 
and referential intentionality. For a mental state has content intentional- 
ity just in case it has representational content, and it has referential 
intentionality just in case there is an object to which it relates in virtue of 
having the content it does.53 To say that Ockham is committed to these 
distinctions, however, is not to say that he fully or consistently recog- 
nizes them. To see this, we need only turn to his intermediate account of 
judgment. 
52 Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 6 (OPh II, 357-8). 
53 What the foregoing makes clear, therefore, is that Ockham's rejection of premise (1) 
is a rejection of a relational analysis of content intentionality, but this still allows for 
a relational analysis of referential intentionality. That is, Ockham can and does still 
allow that mental acts, in virtue of their content, may relate or refer to certain objects. 
Hereafter, I will ignore this complication. Thus, in what follows, when I speak of 
Ockham adhering to or rejecting a 'relational analysis of intentionality/ 1 mean only 
to be speaking about his analysis of content intentionality. 
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3. Intermediate Theory of Judgment 
Having seen how Ockham replies to the objector's argument as applied 
to apprehension, we might expect him to reply in a similar manner when 
he considers its application to judgment. That is to say, having rejected 
the relational analysis of content intentionality for the case of apprehen- 
sion, we might expect him to do the same for judgment as well. In fact, 
however, this is not what Ockham does. Instead, when he turns to acts 
of judgment and their objects, he seems to blur the very distinction at the 
heart of his reply in the case of apprehension - that is, between content 
and referential intentionality. TTius, in the case of judgment, Ockham 
does not deny either (1) or (2) of the argument, but assumes along with 
his objector that acts of judgment must always be related to or terminate 
at propositions - where propositions are taken as objects that constitute 
the judgment's content. As he explains: 
(I) If we speak of the act of knowing some proposition, then it can be said that this 
act is an act that is distinct from the act [of apprehension] that is the proposition. 
And, therefore, when some mental proposition is known, there are two acts of 
the intellect occurring simultaneously, namely, the act that is the proposition 
and the other act by means of which the proposition is known. Nor does one 
ever find Aristotle denying that two acts of the intellect can exist at the same 
time in the intellect, especially when it comes to acts ordered in the way these 
are: proposition and act of knowing it.54 
As this passage makes clear, Ockham still construes the content of a 
judgment (in this case, an act of knowledge) as an entity, distinct from 
the act and to which it relates. Thus, when it comes to providing an 
analysis of judgment, at least during the intermediate stage of his devel- 
opment, Ockham simply sticks to his early relational analysis - includ- 
ing his early tendency to overlook the distinction between a state's 
content and referential intentionality. Initially, therefore, on the mental- 
act account, as on the fictum account, acts of judgment relate to proposi- 
tions as their object. 
This is not to say that the account of judgment undergoes no change 
at the intermediate stage. On the contrary, Ockham's analysis of propo- 
sitions as propositionally contentful acts of apprehension requires him 
54 'Sed si loquamur de actu sciendi aliquam propositionem, sic potest dici quod ille 
actus est alius actus a propositione. Et ideo quando aliqua propositio in mente scitur, 
tune sunt duo actus intellectus simul, scilicet ipsa propositio et actus alius quo scitur 
ilia propositio. Nee unquam invenitur ab Aristotele quod negaret duos actus 
intellectus posse simul esse in intellectu, maxime de actibus ordinatis cuiusmodi 
sunt propositio et actus sciendi earn' (Expos.Perih. Prol, sec. 6 OPh n, 358). Cf. Section 
12 (OPh II, 375) where Ockham says much the same thing. 
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to concede that what serves as the object for judgments are other mental 
acts. Indeed, it is this concession that determines his response to the 
objector's argument as applied to judgments. Instead of rejecting the first 
and second premises, as he had done in the case of apprehension, he now 
responds by rejecting premise (7) - which is just to say he admits the 
possibility of several mental acts existing in one person simultaneously. 
Unlike his opponent, however, Ockham claims to find nothing incoher- 
ent or even particularly problematic about allowing for this possibility 
- at least when the acts in question are ordered as 'proposition and act 
of knowing it.' 
What is characteristic of Ockham's intermediate theory of judgment, 
therefore, is that it is based on a kind of disjunctive analysis of intentional 
states. With regard to apprehension, Ockham denies the relational analy- 
sis. Acts of propositional apprehension, he claims, do not possess their 
propositional content in virtue of a relation to a propositional entity - 
rather such acts just are propositions, that is, they are acts that are, in 
themselves, propositionally contentful. While acts of apprehension may 
relate to certain objects, the relation they bear to such objects does not 
constitute their possessing the content they do. With regard to judgment, 
however, he insists that the relational analysis of content intentionality 
still holds. Acts of judgment, he still maintains, relate to propositions as 
providing their content. 
There is, of course, something puzzling about all of this. We would 
expect Ockham to provide a uniform analysis of intentional states, and 
in particular to have invoked the distinction between content and refer- 
ential intentionality in the case of judgment, since he'd already done so 
in the case of apprehension. That he fails to do so, I believe, owes to the 
fact that when he first begins to entertain the mental-act theory of 
concepts, he simply does not fully appreciate all of its implications for 
his early relational analysis of intentionality. This is not to say, however, 
that this intermediate theory is merely a residue of Ockham early think- 
ing about judgment during a period of transition. For, although Ockham 
holds this intermediate theory for a short time, it does appear to be a 
considered position - one that he not only has some reason to defend, 
but also one that he became notorious for holding.55 
55 Indeed, although the only textual evidence for this position comes from the period 
during which Ockham vacillates between the fictwn and mental-act theory of 
concepts, it seems he did take this 'intermediate' theory of judgment seriously. For, 
even as he began to prefer the mental-act theory of concepts he seems to have 
continued to defend his early view that acts of judgment terminate at mental 
propositions. In fact, the evidence suggests that Ockham abandoned this view only 
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In fact, we can begin to understand how Ockham could have arrived 
at this disjunctive position if we note that in the case of propositional 
apprehension the mental-act account of concepts forces Ockham to a 
rejection of the relational analysis, whereas it provides no such impetus 
in the case of judgment. To see this, we need only observe that adopting 
the mental-act account of concepts raises the problem of intentionality 
all over again - at least in the case of apprehension. For what, in the 
absence oificta, is to serve as the object for thoughts involving non-exis- 
tents? Clearly, Ockham cannot appeal to mental entities such asficta to 
provide the content for propositional apprehension, and he will not 
countenance propositional entities (e.g. propositions, facts, or states of 
affairs as they are nowadays conceived) in extramental reality. Thus, the 
only recourse for him is to reject the assumption that an apprehension's 
possessing content consists in a relation to some object - that is, to reject 
the relational analysis of content intentionality. 
Accordingly, as we noted above, Ockham moves from thinking of acts 
of propositional apprehension as having mental propositions as objects 
to thinking of such acts as themselves being mental propositions. Notice, 
however, that the same pressure to abandon the relational analysis is not 
present in the case of judgment. For if acts of apprehension are them- 
selves thought of as propositions, there is no problem finding objects for 
acts of judgment. Acts of apprehension themselves can play this role. 
And, given Ockham's early assumptions about the logical ordering 
among the intellect's various acts, it follows that judgments are always 
going to be preceded (logically) by a propositional apprehension. For 
every judgment there will be a prior propositional apprehension to serve 
as its object (that is, as its content). Thus, when Ockham first begins to 
develop the mental-act account of concepts, there may have seemed to 
be little need to alter his early view of judgment as directed at mental 
propositions. 
What is more, there are further considerations that provide Ockham 
with considerable impetus not to abandon the relational analysis in the 
case of judgment. For example, Ockham's early characterization of 
judgment (namely, as mental assent (or dissent) to a proposition) naturally 
lends itself to a relational interpretation. In addition, as Ockham envi- 
sions it, the process leading up to the formation of a judgment is one in 
under fire of criticism from Walter Chatton. Indeed Chatton, who criticizes Ock- 
ham's intermediate theory of judgment at length, appears to have played a signifi- 
cant role in convincing Ockham that this intermediate view is untenable. I examine 
the role Chatton plays in the shaping of Ockham's final theory of judgment else- 
where. See Brower-Toland, forthcoming. 
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which a subject begins by merely entertaining (that is, apprehending) a 
given content and then goes on to adopt a certain attitude (namely, 
assent or dissent) with respect to that same content. The fact that the 
content of the judgment and the apprehension (logically) preceding it is 
the same leads Ockham to suppose that the proposition apprehended 
and judged must be numerically the same entity. And since, on the 
mental-act account of concepts, the proposition apprehended is identical 
to an act of apprehension he concludes that acts of judgment are acts 
directed at prior propositional apprehensions.56 
In light of all this, we can now see that commentators have been right 
in thinking that even when Ockham begins to entertain the mental-act 
account of concepts he continues, at least for a time, to adhere to his 
earlier view that judgments are acts that relate to mental propositions as 
(content) objects. It is less clear, however, that such commentators are 
right in their assessment of the resulting theory. According to Pasnau, 
for example, whose views we've already had occasion to mention, if 
judicative attitudes such as knowledge and belief are directed at mental 
acts or states as items that provide their content, then judgment is 
nothing but a kind of self-knowledge. On this view, he says: 
what one knows is a proposition and a proposition is equivalent to an act of 
apprehending. Hence, knowing that human beings are animals is equivalent to 
knowing one's apprehension that human beings are animals. But knowledge of the 
latter sort seems to be self-knowledge; it seems to be knowledge about what one is 
thinking. And it seems quite odd to hold that the knowledge that humans are 
animals is knowledge about one's thoughts.57 
Because Pasnau believes that this theory represents Ockham's last word 
on the matter, he takes its counterintuitive nature to show that Ockham 
56 In addition to these sorts of considerations, Ockham's views about the nature of 
demonstrative scientia must also be taken into account, for his views the nature of 
objects demonstrative knowledge help to explain his views about objects of judica- 
tive attitudes in general. For when it comes to the objects of demonstrative knowl- 
edge (which Ockham refers to as 'knowledge strictly so-called'), Ockham insists 
throughout his career that 'every science whatsoever - whether it is real or rational 
- concerns only propositions. For it concerns those things which are known and 
only propositions are known' (Ord. d.2, q.4 OTh II, 135). As we shall see in section 
3.2, Ockham finds a way to maintain this claim about objects of demonstrative 
science - even in his most mature account of judgment. No doubt his views about 
propositions as objects demonstrative knowledge help to explain his general un- 
willingness to give up the claim that acts of knowing or judging in general relate to 
mental propositions as object. 
57 Pasnau 1997, 289 
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ultimately fails to provide a satisfactory theory of judgment. Here, 
however, Pasnau not only fails to see that this is not Ockham's final 
word, but also fails to appreciate the details of Ockham's views about 
apprehension at this stage of development. For if, as Ockham supposes, 
acts of apprehension involve direct cognitive relations to things in the 
world, then it's fair to say that acts of judgment, in virtue of being related 
to acts of apprehension, also involve cognitive relations to the external 
world. Indeed, Ockham could respond by pointing out that acts of 
judgment have external as well as internal objects. That is to say, it is 
perfectly compatible with his intermediate view to say that while the act 
of judging that human beings are animals relates to an act of apprehension 
as providing its representational content, it nevertheless has human 
beings and animals themselves as its (referential) objects. 
Still Pasnau might insist that Ockham's intermediate view is counter- 
intuitive insofar as it entails that judgment must involve some kind of 
cognition or awareness of other mental states. For insofar as judgments, 
on this view, are attitudes directed at prior acts of apprehension, it would 
seem that they involve at least some cognition or awareness of those acts 
of apprehension. Elizabeth Karger raises just this point in her discussion 
of Ockham's views on judgment. She says: 
It would then follow [from such an account of judgment] that all knowledge and 
belief would involve an introspective awareness of one's own mental acts. But this 
is surely an unacceptable consequence, since there are undoubtedly cases of knowl- 
edge and belief where the agent remains wholly unaware of the workings of his 
own mind.58 
Thus, like Pasnau, Karger thinks there are problems associated with this 
theory. Unlike him, however, she takes them not as evidence that Ock- 
ham's final account is unsatisfactory, but rather as evidence that he never 
held such a theory in the first place. Appealing to Ockham's later 
discussion in his Quodlibetal Questions, she argues that when Ockham 
moves to the mental-act account of concepts, he abandons his early view 
that all judgments relate to propositions. 
Regardless of the difficulties Pasnau and Karger find in foregoing 
account of judgment it is clear that they both draw the wrong conclusions 
from them. In particular, they fail to recognize that this theory of judg- 
ment is an intermediate theory: pace Karger it is a theory that Ockham was, 
for a time, willing to endorse, but pace Pasnau it is also a theory he later 
abandoned. Indeed, as it turns out, Ockham himself - rightly or not - 
58 Karger 1995, 182 
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comes to motivated by the very sorts of considerations raised above to 
abandon this intermediate view and to move to his third and final theory 
of judgment. 
Ill Ockham's Third Theory of Judgment 
Ockham's most mature treatment of judgment occurs in his Quodlibetal 
Questions. He discusses judgment at several places in this work, but in 
what follows I focus primarily on his account in Quodlibet 3, question 8 
(hereafter 'Q.3.8'), since this question contains his most complete treat- 
ment of the issue.59 Before turning specifically to this discussion, how- 
ever, a few general remarks are in order. 
As will become clear, one of the most distinctive features of Ockham's 
third and final theory of judgment is a distinction he introduces between 
two types of judicative act - direct and reflexive. This distinction is a 
special case of a distinction Ockham now draws between 'direct' and 
'reflexive' mental acts generally. As Ockham explains it, 'an act by which 
we understand an object outside the mind is called a direct act, and an 
act by which a direct act itself is understood is called a reflexive act/60 
What Ockham here refers to as a 'direct' mental act, we might perhaps 
think of as a first-order act, that is, as a state involving an awareness only 
of items in the extra-mental world. Reflexive acts are, by contrast, 
second-order acts; they are acts involving awareness of other, first-order 
mental acts. Although Ockham does not in any way restrict this distinc- 
tion to acts of judgment, it is, nevertheless, a distinction to which he 
returns explicitly (and perhaps most frequently) when treating questions 
about judicative acts and their objects.61 
59 Ockham discusses judgment in Quodl. Ill, q. 8; IV, q. 16; V, q. 6 (OTh IX). Ockham's 
Quodlibeta Septem is translated by Freddoso and Kelly (see Ockham 1991). I adopt, 
with some modification, their translation. 
60 Quodl II, q. 12 (OTh IX, 165). Ockham utilizes the distinction between direct and 
reflexive acts in many places throughout his Quodlibeta. 
61 In these contexts, Ockham often does not mark the distinction, using the terms 
'direct' and 'reflexive'; nonetheless, in every place he discusses judgment Ockham 
makes clear that there are direct and reflexive judgments. For example, in Quodl. IV, 
q. 16 he begins his discussion of judgment by pointing out that 'acts of assenting are 
of two sorts. One sort is an act by which I assent that something is or is not 
such-and-such in the way that I assent to its being the case that God exists, and to 
its being the case that God is three and one, and to its being the case that God is not 
the devil.... The second sort of assent is an act by which I assent to something, with 
the result that the act of assenting bears a relation to something, in the way that I 
assent to or dissent from a propositional sign' (OTh IX, 376-7). 
This content downloaded from 165.134.140.94 on Wed, 07 Oct 2015 20:12:32 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality 97 
For ease of exposition, in what follows, I focus - at least initially - 
just on Ockham's treatment of direct acts of judgment. As Ockham 
himself recognizes (see passage (J) below), in the ordinary course of 
things, most judgments are direct or 'first-order' in nature. After all, 
when we form a belief (or other judicative attitude) we typically do so 
without any reflexive awareness of our own mental states. In this respect, 
first-order judicative attitudes represent the paradigm case of judgment. 
Even so, in order to complete our account of Ockham's third and final 
theory judgment we will eventually need to take into consideration what 
he says about second-order judicative acts. I will, therefore, return to 
Ockham's account of reflexive judgments presently. 
1. Objects of Judgments: The Final Account 
By the time Ockham comes to write the Quodlibetal Questions, he has 
finally and fully abandoned \hefictum theory of concepts. Accordingly, 
in Q.3.8, Ockham is presupposing the mental-act theory and so is, once 
again, addressing issues associated with the problem of intentionality. 
In particular, he is responding specifically to a question about the nature 
of objects of judgment. The issue here is not unlike the one Ockham deals 
with in the De Interpretatione prologue; thus, the question to which 
Ockham is now responding is 'whether an act of assenting has as its 
object something complex or something non-complex?' 
This time around Ockham responds by rejecting the claim central both 
to his intermediate account of judgment in the De Interpretione and to his 
early (fictum) theory of judgment. In particular, he now rejects the claim 
that judicative attitudes relate to or terminate at propositions. And we've 
already anticipated his reason for denying this claim: Ockham worries 
that its acceptance would require that every judgment involve some kind 
of self-knowledge, that is, some kind of second-order cognition of one's 
own mental states. 
(J) Speaking of the first [i.e. direct] sort of assent, I claim that such an act does not 
have a proposition (complexum) as its object because such an act is able to exist 
through the mere formulation of a proposition and without any apprehension 
of a proposition. For this reason, it cannot be an act of assenting to a proposition. 
Furthermore, when an ordinary person knows that a rock is not a donkey, he is 
not thinking about a proposition at all and, as a result, he is not assenting to a 
proposition.62 
62 QuodL ffl, q. 8 (OTh IX, 233-234). Cf. Ockham 1991, 196. 
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In this passage, Ockham denies that an act of judgment - or more 
specifically, an act of assent - has a proposition as its object on the 
grounds that this would entail some apprehension or awareness of the 
mental state that is the proposition. For as we've seen, on the mental-act 
theory of concepts, propositions are just a certain type of mental state, 
namely, a state of propositional apprehension. Thus, any act of judgment 
that has a proposition as its object would seem to require some aware- 
ness of another mental state. But, as Ockham points out, we form all 
kinds of judgments without any consciousness of our own thoughts or 
mental states. Thus, he concludes that such judgments do not have 
mental propositions as their object. 
But then, if propositions are not the objects of acts of judging, what are 
we to say about their objects? Ockham's response at this stage will have 
a familiar ring. Strictly speaking, he says, there are no objects for these 
judicative attitudes: 'if you ask whether a thing is known by this act, I 
reply that, properly speaking, one should not say that a thing is known 
by this act.' Or, as he puts it at another point in the same discussion, 
'literally speaking, nothing is believed by such an act [of believing], just 
as nothing is known by an act of knowing.' Here we find Ockham 
making the same kind claim about judgment that he made about propo- 
sitional apprehension on the intermediate theory. And here again he 
overstates the point for the sake of emphasis. In denying that acts of 
judgment have objects, he does not mean to suggest that such acts are 
empty or lack propositional content. In fact, he leaves no room for doubt 
about this. For immediately after claiming, 'one should not say that a 
thing is known by this act,' he hastens to add that one should say 'rather 
that by this act it is known that a rock is not a donkey/63 Thus Ockham's 
point is not to deny that judicative acts have propositional content, but 
merely to distinguish their possessing such content from their relating 
to a proposition as their object. 
The significance of all this should be clear: Ockham is, at last, bringing 
his account of judgment in line with his intermediate account of appre- 
hension. He now wants to say that even in the case of judgment there is 
no object to which the act of judging as its representational content. Thus, 
believing, knowing, or otherwise assenting to (or dissenting from) a 
given propositional content is not to be analyzed as a relation between 
63 Interestingly, some (e.g. Gaskin 2003, n.3) have taken Ockham's remarks in this 
context to imply that he means to introduce entities of a new ontological type - 
facts or states of affairs - to serve as objects of judgment. It seems clear, however, 
that Ockham doesn't mean to be quietly changing his ontological commitments, but 
rather just specifying the content of the judicative state in question. 
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an act of judgment on the one hand and a proposition on the other. 
Rather, to believe, or know (etc.) a proposition is just to possess an act 
(or, as we might say, to occupy a state) of assent that, is itself proposition- 
ally contentful. In other words, Ockham is now committed to a non-rela- 
tional analysis of intentionality - both for apprehension and for 
judgment. 
Here again, however, it is important to recognize that denying a 
relational analysis of content intentionality does not thereby entail that 
judicative attitudes bear no relation to extra-mental objects. Quite the 
contrary. Ockham insists that when we form these sorts of judgments, 
we are judging about - and, hence, stand in some sort of intentional 
relation to - things in extramental reality. Consider, for example, what 
he says about the previous example of judging that a rock is not a donkey: 
(K) Although it is by means of a proposition formulated in the intellect that one 
affirms and knows that things are such and such in reality or that things are 
not such and such in reality, one nonetheless does not perceive this [proposi- 
tion]. Instead, the act of assenting has as its object things outside the mind, 
namely, a rock and a donkey. And yet it is not the case that a rock is known or 
that a donkey is known; rather, what is known is that a rock is not a donkey.64 
What Ockham tells us here is that although 'an act of assenting has as its 
object things outside the mind/ nevertheless, such objects are not what 
'is known' by the act of assenting. Ockham's explicit distinction between 
the content of an act of assenting (e.g., that a rock is not a donkey) and 
what serves as its object (e.g., rocks and donkeys) shows that he now 
recognizes, in the case of judgment as well as apprehension, the distinc- 
tion between content and referential intentionality. Accordingly, Ock- 
ham allows here, as in the case of apprehension, that although the 
judgment's having content does not consist in its being related to one or 
more objects, it can, nevertheless, be said to relate to extramental entities 
(rocks and donkeys) as objects - but only insofar as they are taken to be 
referential objects. 
As all of this makes clear, Ockham's final theory of judgment now 
forms part of a unified account of intentionality. During the intermediate 
period, Ockham accepted a disjunctive account: he provided a non-rela- 
tional analysis of intentionality for apprehension, but retained his earlier 
relational analysis in the case of judgment. In his third and final theory, 
however, Ockham makes a complete rejection of the relational analysis 
of intentionality, and thereby brings his account of judgment into con- 
formity with his intermediate view of apprehension. 
64 Quodl. Ill, q. 8 (OTh IX, 234). Cf. Ockham 1991, 196-197. 
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2. Mental Propositions as Objects of Knowledge? 
The Case of Reflexive Assent 
In light of the foregoing, Ockham's account of reflexive judicative acts 
may seem somewhat surprising. For when Ockham considers what 
should be said about the nature of the objects for reflexive judgments, 
his response runs rather differently than it did in the case of direct acts: 
(L) Speaking now concerning the second [namely, reflexive] act of knowing or 
assenting, I say that this [type of] act is, properly speaking, a propositional act 
that has a proposition as its object. For this act is one by which something true 
is known. But an external thing is not known, for I do not know a rock or 
donkey.65 
On the surface, Ockham would appear to be returning (once again) to 
his earlier, relational analysis of judgment. Indeed, I suspect that Ock- 
ham's talk here, and throughout his later works, of knowledge having 
'a proposition as its object' has tended to mislead commentators. For 
Ockham does, in all of his late writings (for example, in works such as 
his Summa Logicae and his Exposition of Aristotle's Physics - both of which 
are composed at roughly the same time as the Quodlibetal Questions), 
continue to speak of judicative attitudes - in particular, of knowledge 
(scientia) - as relating to mental propositions. Yet we need only keep 
in mind the distinction just mentioned between content and referential 
intentionality to see that there is no inconsistency here: such judgments 
have mental propositions as objects in precisely the sense that direct 
judgments have extramental entities (like rocks and donkeys) as objects. 
Indeed, in allowing that some judicative acts (namely, those that are 
reflexive) relate to mental propositions, Ockham is only acknowledging 
that there are at least some occasions on which we attend to and even 
form judgments about our own (first-order) mental states. For instance, 
we can judge about a given propositional apprehension (say, the first- 
order apprehension that a rock is not a donkey) that it is true, say, or that 
it is false. And, in such cases, what the judgment in question refers to (and 
65 Quodl. m, q. 8 (OTh IX, 234). Ockham repeats much the same point a bit later in the 
same discussion: 'Speaking concerning an act or habit of believing in the second [i.e. 
reflexive] way, [I say that] they have a proposition - for example, an article of faith 
- for their object. After all, nothing is believed unless it is true, and nothing is true 
except a proposition/ 
66 See, for example, qq. 1-12 in Ockham's SL UI-2 {OPh I, 505-526) and passages from 
Ockham's Exposition of Aristotle's Physics such as that quoted in the introduction of 
this paper. In the passage I quoted earlier, Ockham claims that 'all knowledge 
(scientia) is in relation to a [mental] proposition or propositions/ 
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so has as object) is not something in the extramental world, but is rather 
something in the mind - namely, a mental proposition. 
Since Ockham makes quite explicit in his Quodlibetal Questions that it 
is only reflexive, or second-order judgments that can be said to have 
propositions for objects, we can also safely assume that when he claims, 
in other contexts, that knowledge relates to mental propositions, he is 
referring only to reflexive or second-order acts of knowing.67 Although 
in texts such as his Exposition of Aristotle's Physics or in the Summa Logicae 
treatment of Aristotelian demonstration Ockham doesn't explicitly mark 
the distinction between direct and reflexive acts, nevertheless, the over- 
arching context makes perfectly clear that the kind of knowledge in 
question is, in fact, second-order. For in each of these texts, the knowl- 
edge about which Ockham is speaking is 'knowledge strictly so-called' 
(scientia propria dicta), a kind of specialized knowledge associated with 
the philosophical discipline of Aristotelian demonstrative science.68 Such 
knowledge is arrived at only via a demonstrative syllogism. But as 
Ockham explicitly points out in Q.3.8, demonstrative knowledge is 
reflexive in nature, since such knowledge amounts to an act of judging 
or assenting to the truth of a conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism: 
(M) It is [the reflexive] act that philosophers are commonly speaking of. For they 
claim that the effect of a demonstration is a habit [or dispositional knowledge] 
that relates to a conclusion. Consequently, the [occurent] act corresponding to 
that habit is an act that relates to a conclusion as its object. Philosophers also 
claim that nothing is known except what is true, and they are speaking of a 
proposition.69 
Here Ockham not only explicitly connects reflexive judgments with 
demonstrative scientia, but makes clear that such judgments are special 
67 Claude Panaccio, in his discussion of reflexive judgment, makes a similar point 
about the relation between reflexive assent and acts of scientia. See Panaccio 2005, 
35. 
68 Aristotle's Posterior Analytics is, of course, the text in which he sets out the details of 
his theory of demonstration. Thus, for example, when Ockham discusses objects of 
knowledge, in SL III-2 (a treatment of the material from Aristotle's Posterior Ana- 
lytics) it should be clear that the sort knowledge with which Ockham is concerned 
(and which he claims has mental propositions as objects) is demonstrative knowl- 
edge. Similarly, since according to Ockham, the Aristotelian science of physics is a 
demonstrative science, it is also the case that when speaking of objects of knowledge 
in the context of his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Ockham must be understood 
as speaking about the objects of this demonstrative science. 
69 Quodl. Ill, q.8 (OTh IX, 234). This passage follows immediately upon the passage 
quoted at (L) above. 
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cases - cases in which what we are judging about, or giving assent to, 
is the truth of certain conclusions. In these cases, judgments do relate to 
mental propositions (conclusions understood as complex concepts), but 
here again the relation they bear to such propositions would appear to 
be a function of their referential intentionality. 
Given this, we can now see that the mere fact that Ockham speaks of 
reflexive judgments and acts of scientia as relating to mental propositions 
provides no reason for thinking that he does not in fact ultimately reject 
the relational account of judgment or his early view that propositions 
constitute the content for judicative acts. Indeed, far from showing that 
Ockham vacillates in his rejection of earlier views, it reflects rather a level 
of clarity and sophistication present in his third and final theory. Once 
Ockham abandons the relational account of content intentionality for 
judicative as well as apprehensive attitudes, he's able not only to provide 
a unified account of mental content, but also to distinguish between first- 
and second-order mental acts and the type of object to which such acts 
(respectively) refer. 
IV Conclusion: Judgment, Intentionality, and 
Ockham's shift from Ficta to mental-acts 
I've now completed my argument for the claim that Ockham articulates 
not two, but three distinct theories of judgment. And, in light of this 
argument, we are now in a position to fully appreciate the way in which 
the developments in Ockham's account of judgment sheds light on 
broader developments in his philosophy of mind. 
To begin, we have seen that the three-fold development in Ockham's 
thinking about judgment cannot be understood apart from a broader 
three-stage development in his thinking about intentionality. Ockham 
initially holds a relational analysis of intentional states; that is to say, he 
assumes that the representational content for a given intentional act is an 
object external to it and to which it relates. But as his views about the 
nature of concepts change, so too does his attitude toward the relational 
analysis. Thus, as we have seen, when Ockham first encounters the 
mental-act theory, he is willing to reject the relational analysis for a certain 
subset of mental states (namely, apprehensions), thereby giving rise to 
what I called his 'intermediate' or 'disjunctive' account of intentionality 
(since it presupposes one analysis for apprehensions, and another for 
judgments). It is only in the third and final stage of his thinking - the 
stage at which he unambiguously prefers the mental-act theory of con- 
cepts - that Ockham rejects the relational analysis for all intellective acts, 
apprehension as well as judgment. And part of the explanation for this 
final stage of development, we've now seen, is that at this stage Ockham 
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finally comes to recognize fully and to apply consistently the distinction 
between content and referential intentionality. 
Recognition of this evolution in Ockham's thinking about the nature 
of intentionality not only helps to make sense of the various changes in 
his account of judgment, but also seems to me to provide new insight 
into the way in which his views about concepts develop - insight that 
allows us to refine and extend the received account of his shift from the 
fictum to the mental-act account of concepts. Up to this point, I've left the 
developments in Ockham's views of concepts largely in the background 
in order to focus on his views about judgment and intentionality more 
generally. I want to conclude, however, by bringing this final feature of 
Ockham's philosophy of mind to the foreground. 
By comparison with Ockham's views about judgment and intention- 
ality, developments in his thinking about the nature of concepts have 
received a good deal of scholarly attention.70 Even so, scholars have 
tended to focus exclusively on the termini of this development - the 
fictum and mental-act theories, respectively - paying considerably less 
attention to the intermediate stage during which Ockham holds that the 
two theories are equally plausible. Unfortunately, this tendency to gloss 
over the middle phase has led scholars to overlook a problem with the 
received account of Ockham's motivation for abandoning the fictum 
theory of concepts. 
As I've mentioned already, Ockham's rejection of the fictum theory is 
very often taken to be motivated entirely by metaphysical and epistemo- 
logical considerations - in particular, by the considerations raised by his 
junior colleague, Walter Chatton.71 As we've seen, Chatton argues 
against the fictum theory on the grounds that ficta are (a) ontologically 
70 Two recent, and extremely valuable, discussions of Ockham's developing views on 
concepts are Boler 2003 and Panaccio 2005, 21-36. The latter of these two discussions 
came into print only after I'd completed this paper. While Panaccio and I draw very 
different conclusions about the ultimate motivation for the development in Ock- 
ham's thinking about concepts, I was pleased to discover a surprising amount of 
common ground in the two discussions. For despite a variety of interpretive 
differences we seem, nonetheless, to share the view that the shift in Ockham's 
thinking about concepts is to be explained, ultimately, as a function of his coming 
to abandon certain early assumptions he held about the relation between mental 
acts and their objects. See Panaccio 2005, 23-27. 
71 See, for example, Adams' (1977) account of the development in Ockham's account 
of concepts. Adams places special emphasis on ontological considerations as moti- 
vating the shift, going so far as to recommend that Ockham's 'change of mind be 
viewed as a reasoned ontological conversion' (145-6). See also Pasnau 1997, 76-86, 
277-90. 
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superfluous, and (b) epistemologically worrisome. While, I think there 
can be no doubt that these objections figure importantly in Ockham's 
thinking, I also think it's clear that they cannot, by themselves, explain the 
way his views actually develop. For if we assume that the ontological and 
epistemological considerations just mentioned are what ultimately moti- 
vate Ockham to abandon/i'cta, we are at once faced with the problem of 
explaining why these same considerations don't immediately motivate 
him to do so. We would expect that, once Ockham comes to be aware of 
Chatton's mental-act account, and so aware both of the metaphysical and 
epistemological problems for \he fictum theory as well as of the possibility 
for developing a theory that makes no appeal to them, he would imme- 
diately adopt that alternate theory. The fact that he does not do so - but 
rather explicitly denies, during the intermediate stage, that the mental-act 
theory possesses any theoretical advantage over the fictum theory - 
strongly suggests that there are additional considerations to be factored 
into Ockham's ultimate shift to the mental-act theory of concepts. Thus, 
in short, the problem with the received account of Ockham's developing 
views of concepts is that it cannot explain the intermediate stage in this 
development.7 
If, however, we consider the intermediate stage in Ockham's thinking 
about concepts in light of the broader developments in his views about 
judgment and intentionality, his initial ambivalence toward the mental- 
act theory becomes perfectly intelligible. As we've seen, the intermediate 
stage of concepts corresponds to the intermediate stage of his thinking 
about judgment and intentionality. But during this stage, there is a 
perfectly good explanation for why Ockham's would regard the fictum 
and mental-act theories as theoretically on a par. 
To begin, note that it is not at all clear, at this stage, that Chatton's 
epistemological objection to the fictum theory carries any weight. It is 
true that, on the fictum theory, intentional acts terminate (in at least some 
cases) at 'concepts' and, hence, that cognition turns out to be mediated 
by mind-dependent entities. But, at least as Ockham initially under- 
stands it, the mental-act theory carries the same consequence. For even 
on the mental-act theory, one must appeal to mind-dependent entities 
to serve as objects for certain intentional states (namely, judgments). But, 
then, in this respect the mental-act theory is really no better off than the 
fictum theory: both involve a commitment to mental intermediaries of 
72 Boler (2003) raises and addresses a similar issue. Indeed, it is Boler who first 
suggested to me that my interpretation of the developments in Ockham's thinking 
about judgment and intentionality might provide some insight into the intermediate 
stage in his thinking about concepts. 
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some sort; the only difference is in the nature of the intermediaries 
(mental acts in one case, ficta in the other) and in the acts which require 
them (judgments in one case, both judgments and apprehension in the 
other). 
Much the same can be said for Chatton's ontological-parsimony objec- 
tion. It is true that, insofar as the fictum theory invokes both mental acts 
and ficta, it appeals to more entities (or more types of entity) than the 
mental-act theory, which appeals to only mental acts. Even so, it is not 
clear that this, by itself, would have led Ockham to regard the mental-act 
theory as possessing a significant theoretical advantage over the fictum 
theory. For even on the mental-act theory, as Ockham construes it during 
the intermediate period, there is still an act-object distinction (at least for 
judgments), and thus we are still forced to admit two different ontological 
roles (namely, a mental-act role and an object role) in order to provide a 
complete account of intentionality. But here again we have a respect in 
which the mental-act theory offers no significant advantage over the 
fictum theory: insofar as both theories appeal to the same number of 
ontological roles in their analysis of intentionality, the mental-act theory 
cannot be regarded as theoretically simpler (or more elegant) than the 
fictum theory. Indeed, to the extent that the fictum theory appeals to a 
unified (as opposed to a disjunctive) analysis of intentionality, it appears 
to be the theoretically simpler (or more elegant) of the two. 
What all of this goes to show, I think, is that we can explain Ockham's 
initial ambivalence toward the mental-act theory (and thus the interme- 
diate stage in thinking about concepts) if (and perhaps only if) we place 
it in the context of his broader views about intentionality. Moreover, 
once we do this we can also appreciate why it is that Chatton's two 
criticisms eventually did come to seem so compelling. For it is only when 
Ockham finally gets clear about the distinction between content and 
referential intentionality, and thus fully grasps the possibility of a uni- 
fied non-relational analysis of intentionality, that he is able to see that 
there is a form of mental-act theory that has just the advantages that 
Chatton claims for it. As Ockham explains, in the final stage of his 
thinking: 
(N) In favor of [the mental-act theory] there is the principle that what is done through 
many is done in vain if it can be done with fewer. But everything preserved by 
positing something distinct from an act of thinking can be preserved without 
positing any such distinct thing.... Therefore, it is not necessary to posit any- 
thing beyond an act of thinking.73 
73 SL 1.12 (OPH 43) 
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Here it would seem that Ockham envisages a form of mental-act theory 
that rejects altogether the use of an act-object distinction to account for 
intentional content. In doing so, moreover, he recognizes that this form 
of mental-act theory, unlike the intermediate version, really does have a 
theoretical advantage: not only does it do with fewer types of entity (i.e., 
mental acts alone) what the fictum theory does with more (namely, 
mental acts and ficta), but it also avoids the excess of postulating distinct 
entities to play the ontological role of content. And, of course, in doing 
away with the need for postulating such entities, he also avoids postu- 
lating anything that would mediate between acts of thinking and their 
(referential) objects. 
What emerges from all this, I believe, is that, as in the case of judgment, 
the development in Ockham's views about concepts cannot be under- 
stood apart from the developments in his broader views about intention- 
ality. But this in turn just goes to reinforce the value of approaching 
Ockham's views on both concepts and intentionality from the perspec- 
tive of his theory of judgment. For, if the argument of this paper is correct, 
Ockham's account of the nature of concepts and of the nature and 
structure of intentionality itself are closely bound up with - are indeed 
at times only observable from the vantage point of - his treatment of 
judgment.74 
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74 This paper has been improved at many stages in its development by valuable 
comments and criticism I've received from a number of people. In particular, I 
would like to thank John Boler, Alicia Finch, Carl Ginet, Bob Pasnau, Scott MacDon- 
ald, Scott Spiker, Jason Stanley, Zoltan Szabo, and especially Jeff Brower. I read a 
version of this paper at the 2004 Cornell Summer Colloquium in Medieval Philoso- 
phy and would like to thank the colloquium participants for useful feedback on that 
occasion. 
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